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Abstract
This paper argues that lexical and operator-based analyses of distributivity are
not in conflict, but should exist alongside each other to get a full account of all the
relevant data. We use several contrasts between plural definites (e.g. the girls) and
group NPs (e.g. the group of girls) to show that we need an operator-based analysis of
distributivity; this kind of distributivity is available with plural definites but not with
group subjects, which can be explained under the common assumption that group
NPs denote atoms rather than sums and hence do not allow quantification over their
individual parts. At the same time, we need a lexical theory of distributivity to account
for the various distributive interpretations that we do find with groups.
The distributive interpretation of sentences like The team is wearing an orange vest
provides a challenge to this story, but only if the indefinite an orange vest is analysed
as a quantifier. We argue, however, that it should be analysed as a property, and that
the distributive interpretation is actually a case of two-place lexical distributivity over
a property and a group. Support for this non-quantificational analysis comes from
the observation that the class of predicates that allows a distributive interpretation in
these contexts seems to be precisely the class of ‘incorporation predicates’ (Le Bruyn,
De Swart & Zwarts 2015) that allow bare complements in many languages.




How do we make inferences about individuals based on sentences that involve pred-
ication over a plurality? For instance, why do we conclude from (1a) that it is the
individual children who laughed, and from (1b) that each of the girls probably had a
beer of her own?
(1) a. The children laughed.
b. The girls had a beer.
In the early 1980s, two different answers to this question were proposed. According
to Scha (1981), there is no formal difference between the derivation of the distributive
interpretation of the sentences in (1) - which supports the inference that the property
expressed by the predicate holds of the single individuals that make up the plural
denotation - and the derivation of the collective interpretation of sentences like the




gathered in the garden.
met last week.
are a good team.
,.
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Unlike the examples in (1), the sentences in (2) do not involve the ‘trickling down’ of
the predicate to individual members of the plurality but rather express that a certain
property holds of the plurality as a whole. In both cases, according to Scha, the predi-
cate applies directly to the denotation of the plural definite, and any information about
the way its individual members participate in the expressed event is part of the lexical
semantics of the predicate. We know that in order to be able to laugh one needs lungs
and a vocal apparatus, and we know that individuals have this but groups or collec-
tions do not; hence, we interpret The children laughed as a statement about individual
children. Similarly, we know that gathering cannot be done by single individuals but
only by groups, and hence we interpret the children gathered as a statement about a
collection of children. Thus, according to Scha’s analysis, collectivity and distributivity
inferences with referential expressions are not triggered by the compositional semantics
of the sentences in question, but by lexical information.
However, the account most widely adopted is the one originating in Link (1983),
which analyses distributivity in terms of a semantic operator comparable to the overt
universal quantifier each.1 This distributivity operator (henceforth D-operator) quan-
tifies over the members of a plurality, allowing the predicate to apply to each of these
individuals. According to the operator-based account, the semantics of (1a), for exam-
ple, should be analysed as follows:
(3) (D(laugh))(the children) = @x P the children [ laugh(x) ]
In the most radical version of the operator-based analysis, exemplified by Link (1983,
1987), there is a direct correlation between the semantic mechanism used and the
interpretation derived: direct predication over a plural individual results in a collective
interpretation; using a D-operator results in a distributive interpretation. This means
that a plural distributive predicate like laugh must be interpreted via an operator-based
mechanism, and a plural collective predicate like gather must be interpreted via direct
predication. A sentence like (1b) (The girls had a beer) can be interpreted in both
1Link (1983) proposes an operator  that pluralises distributive predicates like laugh; from the algebraic
properties of  and the fact that its application is restricted to predicates that contain nothing but atomic
individuals in their extension, it follows that whenever a plurality is in the extension of P , P is true of
all the atoms that make up the plurality. The D-operator as covert each was proposed in Link (1987) and
further fleshed out by Roberts (1987). Unlike , the application of the D-operator is not a priori restricted
to a particular class of predicates, which enables a purely structural analysis of distributivity.
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ways: if its semantics is derived by means of a D-operator, we get the distributive
interpretation according to which each girl had a beer of her own, and if it is derived
by means of direct predication, we get the collective interpretation according to which
the girls shared the beer.
In practice, the operator-based analysis as it is usually adopted is somewhat less
radical. Roberts (1987), citing Dowty (1987) as her influence, explicitly argues that ap-
plying a D-operator to a distributive predicate is unnecessary, because the distributive
aspect is part of “the sense of the predicate”. Just as there is no need to formally restrict
the extension of the predicate grasp to those entities that have opposable thumbs, there
is no need to restrict our formal semantics in such a way that distributive predicates
can only apply to individuals (and collective predicates to pluralities): this restriction
simply follows from their lexical meaning. Like Roberts, Winter (1997), while accept-
ing that we need a D-operator to be able to adequately capture the truth conditions of
more complex sentences like (1b), suggests that the simple cases like (1a) may involve
direct predication and lexical semantics, as in Scha’s analysis. A similar distinction
between lexical and operator-based distributivity is adopted by Hoeksema (1988) and
Champollion (2010).2
These more mixed approaches to distributivity agree with the observation made by
various authors (Dowty, 1987; Verkuyl & van der Does, 1996; Verkuyl, 1994) that the
line between collectivity and distributivity is not as clear-cut as Link’s division suggests.
Dowty (1987) notes that even many collective predicates enable certain inferences about
individuals; he calls these inferences subentailments. For example, while we cannot infer
(4b) from (4a), we can infer (4c):
(4) a. The children gathered in the garden.
b. *Each child gathered in the garden.
c. Each child was in the garden.
If the inference from (4a) to (4c) were enabled by some covert operator, such an op-
erator would need to be able to break up the lexical meaning of gather and distribute
only part of it to the individual children. There is no way to do this in standard
model-theoretic semantics, and even if there were, every subentailing predicate would
need its own corresponding operator to ensure the distribution of only the intended
meaning parts. Considering this, it is reasonable to assume that the inference from
(4a) to (4c) is enabled not by a covert quantificational mechanism but by the lexical
properties of the predicate to gather. But then, if the distributive inference from (4a) to
(4c) can be lexically based, without actual quantification over individual children, the
same should hold for the distributive inference from “The children laughed” to “Each
child laughed”. Put differently, if part of a predicate meaning can be distributed over
members of a plurality by a lexical process, there is no reason why the same process
couldn’t be responsible for the lexical distributivity of entire predicate meanings, if
this were supported by the semantics of the verb and the context. There seems to be
little conceptual sense in a theory that allows for subentailment but not for full lexical
distributivity.
A counterargument to this kind of reasoning, however, is brought up by Landman
(1996, 2000) (who, as far as I am aware, is the only author who has explicitly argued
against the possibility that at least some distributive interpretations could be due
2Bartsch (1973) is an early example of an account of plurality in which distributivity is sometimes
made explicit in the formal semantics, and sometimes left to lexical inferencing, but she is not very explicit
about this aspect of her theory. In Kroch (1974), plural predication introduces a universal quantifier, but an
additional interpretation rule ensures that distributive readings generated in this way come out as anomalous
if they are incompatible with the lexical semantics of the predicate.
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to lexical inferences). Landman’s point is based on argument structure: whatever
saturates the argument position of laugh in the sentence “The children laughed” is not
just there to give the sentence a grammatical subject so it may end up as an expression
of type t, it also receives the thematic agent role from the verb. If the subject argument
of a distributive predicate could be a collection of individuals, Landman argues, this
entire collection would be assigned the role of agent; but that would render the entire
notion of ‘agent’ both meaningless and useless, since the collection itself is not in fact
the agent of the expressed event (it’s the individual children that are the laughing
agents, not the group of children as a whole). So according to Landman, we really do
need a quantificational mechanism that allows us to interpret “The children laughed” as
expressing a whole series of laughing events, each with their own individual agent. On
the other hand, with a collective verb like gather, the subject plurality as a whole should
receive the agent role; the fact that there are certain subentailments to individuals does
not change the fact that the agent of the gathering event is still the collection as a whole.
So, on the one hand, we have a conceptual argument suggesting that what I have
called the ‘radical’ Linkian approach, which assumes that covert quantification is the
only way to derive a distributive interpretation, is somewhat too strict and that it is
plausible that lexical semantics takes care of at least some distributive inferences. On
the other hand, we have a similarly conceptual argument against this idea, suggesting
that sentences cannot be properly interpreted when the individual agents of distributive
events are not identified as such in the formal semantics. This means that the question
of lexical distributivity needs to be decided on empirical grounds - can we demonstrate
empirically whether we need to equip our theory with some lexical means of deriving
distributive inferences (in addition to a formal one)?
Although Winter (1997, 2000) does not make an explicit empirical case for lexical
distributivity, it is possible to make such a case on the basis of the data in Winter
(2000). More recently, Champollion (2010) argues (following observations by Lasersohn
(1989, 1995), Schwarzschild (1996) and others) that lexical distributivity freely allows
intermediate or non-atomic interpretations when these are supported by the lexical
semantics of the predicate, while operator-based distributivity only allows a nonatomic
interpretation if this is made sufficiently salient by context. In both cases, lexical
distributivity accounts for distributive interpretations that, according to Winter and
Champollion, cannot be explained in terms of covert quantification.3
In this paper I provide some new empirical evidence along the same lines. I claim
that an operator-based distributivity mechanism is unable to account for certain cases
of distributivity involving group nouns (singular nouns referring to collections of things,
like committee or choir):
(5) The committee laughed.
Sentence (5) clearly has a distributive interpretation, which has motivated some re-
searchers (e.g. Bennett 1974, Pearson 2011, Magri 2012) to analyse the denotations
of group NPs as pluralities that can be quantified over. However, in many cases,
distribution over members of a group is not possible, as exemplified by the following
contrast:
(6) a. The children are hiding somewhere.
ð For each child x, there is a place y such that x is hiding in y.
ð There is a place y such that each child is hiding in y.
b. The class is hiding somewhere.
ô There is a place y such that each child is hiding in y.
3Recent unpublished experimental work by Jakub Dotlačil and Adrian Brasoveanu also shows a pro-
cessing difference between operator-based distributive inferences and distributive inferences that might be
explained in terms of lexical reasoning (Jakub Dotlačil, p.c.).
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Sentence (6b) cannot mean that each child in the class hid in a different place: the only
available interpretation is one where somewhere takes wide scope, according to which
there is a single place in which all the children are hiding. In contrast, sentence (6a)
does have a distributive interpretation, which can be readily accounted for in terms of
covert quantification: if (6a) involves a covert quantifier over children, this quantifier
may take scope over the adverbial somewhere.
Based on contrasts like the one in (6), I show that group NPs in general do not allow
distribution over individual members, which is in line with the common assumption
that they are not associated with pluralities but with atoms (e.g. Link, 1984; Landman,
1989; Barker, 1992; Schwarzschild, 1996). If groups are atomic, it will not be possible to
quantify over its individual members, as these are not accessible to the compositional
semantics. This means that any distributive effects that we do find with group NPs
- such as the distributivity in (5)) - cannot be derived by means of a D-operator. I
conclude that we need a theory of lexical distributivity to account for interpretations
like these.
An apparent counterexample to this conclusion are sentences like (7), which seem
to involve a scopal ambiguity comparable to the one in (6a):
(7) The First Aid team is wearing an orange vest.
For many (although not all) native speakers, sentence (7) has a distributive interpre-
tation according to which the individual First Aid team members are each wearing
their own orange vest. However, I argue that this does not force us to adopt a covert
quantifier over members of groups. Crucially, not all predicates allow a distributive
interpretation when they appear with a group subject and an indefinite object; as I
will show, this property seems to be limited to so-called HAVE-predicates Borthen
(2003); Espinal & McNally (2011); leBruyn et al. (2015). Another property of HAVE-
predicates is that many languages that do not generally allow singular nouns to appear
without a determiner (like Spanish, Catalan, Norwegian, Romanian and Greek) allow
them to take a bare singular complement; (8) shows an example involving the Greek
equivalent of to wear (from Alexandropoulou, 2013):
(8) Forouse frako.
wear.3SG frock.coat
‘S/he was wearing a frock coat’
The more or less standard approach to bare nominals is to analyse them as properties.
Taking the correspondence between the class of HAVE-predicates and the class of
predicates that allow distributivity over a group and an indefinite as a hint, I will
argue that the indefinite in (7) too should be analysed as a property rather than a
quantifier, which enables direct predication over the indefinite and, by that means,
lexical distributivity over the instances of the property it denotes. This means that the
distributive interpretation of sentence (8) can be regarded as a case of two-place lexical
distributivity, comparable to the analysis of codistributivity cases in Scha (1981) and
Winter (2000).
By strengthening both the case for an operator-based analysis of distributivity (to
account for the various contrasts between group NPs and plural definites) on the one
hand, and the case for a lexical theory of distributivity (to account for the various
distributive interpretations that we do find with groups) on the other, this paper aims
to show that these different accounts of distributivity are not in conflict, but should
exist alongside each other to get a full account of all the relevant data. In addition,
the paper provides new evidence for both the atomic nature of group nouns, the possi-
bility for singular indefinites to denote properties even in argument positions (adding
to the growing body of literature on non-quantificational interpretations of indefinites
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in English, e.g. (Milsark, 1974; Carlson, 1977; Partee, 1987; McNally, 1992; Zimmer-
mann, 1993; de Hoop, 1996; Mador-Haim & Winter, 2007)), and the idea that the class
of HAVE-predicates is semantically special even in languages whose syntax does not
reflect this.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I introduce the two kinds of distribu-
tivity and the distinctions between them in more detail. I show that sentences with
plural subjects generally have a wider range of interpretations than their group-subject
counterparts: a sentence with a group NP subject can only receive a distributive inter-
pretation if it is a non-quantificational sentence like (4). I propose an analysis according
to which lexical distributivity is available with both plural and group noun subjects,
while operator-based distributivity is available only with plural subjects; this is in
line with the common assumption that group nouns denote atomic entities. Finally, I
sketch a basic formal account of lexical distributivity in terms of pseudo-equivalences
(?, following); I assume that the interpretation of lexically distributive predication is
determined by a combination of lexical semantics (in the form of non-logical inferences
that are listed as part of the lexical meaning of the verb) and world knowledge.
In section 3, I examine cases like The team is wearing an orange vest and propose
that they, too, can be analysed as lexical distributivity if we assume that the indef-
inite denotes a property rather than a quantifier. Sticking closely to the literature
on HAVE-predicates, I will assume that certain transitive predicates are ambiguous
between an ‘ordinary’ version and an ‘incorporating’ version that takes a property-
type complement. The second part of section 3 looks more closely at the various
properties of linguistic phenomena that have been argued in the literature to involve
non-quantificational indefinites, and shows that these properties apply to the group
distributivity data as well.
In section 4, I will briefly address (and leave open) a remaining issue: the problem
of assigning a property denotation to non-upward-entailing modified numerals.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Two kinds of distributivity
Adopting the terminology of Winter (1997), I will call the two kinds of distributivity
that I want to distinguish Q-distributivity, which corresponds to Link’s D-operator-
based distributivity, and P-distributivity, which corresponds to Scha’s lexical semantics-
based distributivity. Schematically:












Because the analysis in (9b) lacks a one-to-one correspondence between interpretation
and mechanics, it is important to keep the two apart in our terminology. I will use the
terms collectivity and distributivity to refer to interpretations, as follows:
(10) Suppose we have a sentence S of the form X Pred, where X is a plural, conjunction
or group noun, and Pred is a predicate. An interpretation of S is distributive if
we infer that rrPredss(x) for every member x of rrXss; otherwise45 it is collective.
The two semantic mechanisms that I use to derive these interpretations are covert
quantification (for example by means of a D-operator), and direct predication over a
collection.6 Formally:
(11) Suppose we have a sentence S of the form X Pred, where X is a plural, conjunction
or group noun, and Pred is a predicate:
• Applying a D-operator derives the logical form @x P rrXss [rrPredss(x)]
• Direct predication over a collection derives the logical form rrPredss(rrXss).
Finally, and somewhat obviously: a P-distributive interpretation is a distributive in-
terpretation that I propose is derived by direct predication over a collection. A Q-
distributive interpretation is a distributive interpretation that I propose is derived by
the D-operator.
For now, I will put aside the question of the exact nature of P-distributivity and
what it means for a distributive inference to be ‘rooted in the lexical semantics of a
predicate’ - I will discuss these questions in more detail in section 2.3. My goal at
this point is to show that we need some lexical theory of distributivity in additional
to a formal one; to this end, we first need a clearer picture of the kind of distributive
inferences that demonstrate the need for an operator-based distributivity mechanism.
4For now, I am ignoring cases of ‘intermediate distributivity’, as in Rodgers, Hammerstein & Hart wrote
musicals (Gillon, 1987), which is true not because each wrote musicals of their own or because the three of
them wrote musicals together, but because Rodgers and Hammerstein collaborated to write musicals and so
did Rodgers and Hart. The definition in (9) can be straightforwardly extended to accommodate such cases.
5In paraphrasing distributive interpretations in terms of universal quantification, I am also abstracting
away from the well-observed fact that plural predication usually leaves room for exceptions (i.e. members
of the subject collection for which the predicate does not hold). Thus, the sentence “The girls are linguists”
(unlike the universal paraphrase “All the girls are linguists”) can be true even if some of the girls are not
linguists, especially if we are talking about a large number of girls. This particular kind of vagueness is
known as non-maximality (Dowty, 1987; Brisson, 1998). There are three general strategies for dealing with
non-maximality: it can be built into the semantics of the D-operator (e.g. Schwarzschild, 1996; Brisson,
2003); it can be treated as a property of direct predication (Landman 1989; Winter 2002), a view that
predicts that non-maximality should be tied to lexical rather than operator-based distributivity; or it can
be treated as a specific instance of a more general phenomenon of ‘pragmatic slack’ (Lasersohn, 1999). Since
I will not address the issue of non-maximality in this paper, I will simply treat distributivity as more or less
paraphrasable by universal quantification.
6I am using the word ‘collection’ in a pre-theoretical sense here to refer to NP denotations that are at
least conceptually plural - the referents of plural NPs like the girls, conjunctions like Mary, Jane and Sue
or collectives like the group of girls. I will remain agnostic on the ontological status of these collections,
which depends on the larger theory of plural predication we would like to adopt and on the way we analyse
singular group NPs like the group. Here are several options (some of which are more compatible with the
ideas put forward in this paper than others). In Scha (1981), collections are analysed as sets, but so are all
NPs - Scha’s framework does not make any type-theoretic or sortal distinction between the denotations of
singular and plural NPs. In Link (1983) and Schwarzschild (1996), plural NPs and conjunctions are analysed
as sets (or sums, if we prefer a lattice-theoretical formalisation), while singular NPs are analysed as atomic
entities; Winter (2002) is similar but also assumes that the sets associated with plurals and conjunctions can
be mapped into an atomic entity through a typeshifting operation. In Landman (1996, 2000), collections
can be either atomic or set-denoting (with two typeshifts mapping these different interpretations to each
other), but only the latter denotation supports any distributive inferences. In de Vries (2015), all collection-
referring NPs can denote either a set or (via a typeshift) an atom; the former denotation is associated with
Q-distributivity, the latter with P-distributivity.
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2.1 Q-distributivity
As several authors have shown in reply to Scha (1981) (e.g. Winter, 1997; Brisson, 1998),
there are some distributive interpretations that cannot be reduced to a combination of
direct predication and lexical semantics. Here is an example of a sentence for which
a purely lexical approach (like Scha’s) does not completely cover the truth conditions
for the different interpretations available:
(12) The children are hiding somewhere.
If we analyse the adverb somewhere as an existential quantifier over locations, an
analysis in terms of direct predication over a collection would result in the adverb’s
taking scope over the entire plurality of children:
(13) Dx [location(x) ^ hide in(the children,x)]
But this only allows an interpretation in which there is one particular place where the
entire group of children is hiding, whereas (12) also has a distributive interpretation
according to which each child is hiding in a different place. To derive the latter, the
members of the plurality the children need to take scope over the existential quantifier
introduced by somewhere. And the only way to allow the children to have wider scope
than somewhere is to introduce another quantifier, as in (14):
(14) @x P the children [ Dy [location(y) ^ hide in(x, y) ] ]
As we have seen, such a quantificational analysis is generally formalised with the help of
a D-operator, a covert quantifier comparable to overt each. Without this D-operator,
the plural denotation cannot take wide scope, and the meaning of the sentence is
derived through direct predication as in (13).
In the literature, the argument for Q-distributivity is generally made based on the
availability of a distributive interpretation for sentences with an indefinite object, such
as “The girls are wearing a dress” or “The boys ate a sandwich”. But the range of sen-
tence types that demonstrate the need for a quantificational distributivity mechanism
is much broader, as I will show in this section (and in the second part of this paper, I
will argue that these indefinite-based cases are not examples of Q-distributivity at all).
Two additional cases of Q-distributivity are covered in section 2.2.3. DI and/or CI are
shorthand for ‘distributive interpretation’ and ‘collective interpretation’, as defined in
(10).7
2.1.1 Disjunction.
The mathematical equivalence shown in (15) can be seen playing out in natural lan-
guage in entailments like (16):
(15) x P pP YQq ô x P P _ x P Q
(16) Sue is walking or cycling.
ô Sue is walking or Sue is cycling.
When we replace Sue in (16) with a plural definite, the entailment pattern gets a bit
more complicated. A disjunctive sentence like (17) can be interpreted in two different
ways:
7Note that, according to the definition in (10), it is the entire VP that is relevant here, not just the verb;
thus, (15) has a distributive interpretation not because we interpret both walking and cycling as properties of
individuals, but because the whole predicate be walking or cycling can apply to each individual semanticist.
Similarly, ‘CI’ in the case of (15) does not signify that the walking or the cycling are somehow performed
collectively, but that the disjunction be walking or cycling applies to the collection of semanticists rather
than the individuals. As will become clear, formulating the definition in this way will help us to separate
Q- from P-distributivity since it takes into account the VP with all its internal structure, rather than only
looking at the meaning of the verb.
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(17) The semanticists are walking or cycling.
ð For every semanticist x, x is walking or x is cycling. (DI)
ð The semanticists are walking or the semanticists are cycling. (CI)
There are two ways to analyse (17), each of them corresponding to a possible inter-
pretation of the sentence. According to the first analysis, the disjunction walking or
cycling applies to each individual semanticist, which means that (17) is compatible
with a situation in which part of the semanticists are cycling and the other part are
walking. According to the second interpretation, the disjunction walking or cycling
applies to the collection of semanticists as a whole: either they are all walking, or they
are all cycling. While the second interpretation can be analysed in terms of direct
predication over a collection, the first cannot: in order for the disjunction to apply to
each individual semanticist, we need quantification over the set of semanticists.
2.1.2 Quantified expressions.
At the beginning of this section, we have already seen an example of Q-distributivity
involving a quantified expression (somewhere); the following examples also involve
quantifiers (a comparative quantifier in (18), and a numerical quantifier in (19)) ; all
examples are similarly ambiguous between two interpretations. The examples were
chosen in such a way that the DI does not entail the CI; hence, it is possible to imagine
a situation that verifies the DI but falsifies the CI. This means that if we can accept a
sentence as true in such a situation, we have to be able to derive the DI as a separate
reading. It can be shown for each of the cases below that this is only possible by
assuming covert quantification over the members of the subject plurality.
(18) The cows won fewer prizes at the fair than the pig.
a. ð The cows together won fewer prizes than the pig. (CI)
b. ð Every cow won fewer prizes than the pig. (DI)
Figure 1: Cows, pigs and prizes
As a context for (18), imagine a country fair at which prizes are awarded to animals
in various categories. One farmer brought three of her cows and her very best pig,
and all four animals ended up winning a number of prizes. One possible distribution
of prizes is depicted below in Figure 1; sentence (18) is true in this situation under its
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first, distributive, interpretation, since the cows each have two prizes while the pig has
three. However, it is false under its collective interpretation, since the cows together
have six prizes, which is more than the pig has. Direct predication only gives us the
CI: without quantification over individual cows, the quantifier fewer prizes than the
pig necessarily takes scope over the entire subject plurality. Again, we need to assume
some covert quantification mechanism in order to derive the distributive interpretation.
The reasoning is similar for the next example:
(19) These artists dress in black one day a week.
ð For every artist x, there is one day a week y such that x dresses in black on y.
(DI)
ð There is one day a week y such that every artist dresses in black on y. (CI)
Without quantification over individual artists, the only interpretation that can be
derived is the CI, according to which all the artists dress in black on the same day
of the week.
2.1.3 Pronoun binding.
When a pronoun or reflexive is bound by a plural definite subject, it can be interpreted
as either referring back to the entire plurality, or to each of the members of the plurality
individually (as when the pronoun is bound by a universal quantifier). The availability
of the latter interpretation points to the presence of a covert quantifier in the derivation.
I will provide Dutch examples here, to avoid the complications posed by dependent
plurality in English, among other reasons.8
(20) Deze jongens worden woedend als je hun moeder beledigt.
These boys become furious when you their mother insult
‘These boys get furious when you insult their mother(s)’
a. ð These boys get furious when you insult their mum (the boys are brothers).
(CI)
b. ð For every boy x, x gets furious when you insult x’s mum. (DI)
Because the NP hun moeder ‘their mother’ is singular here, we would not expect the
distributive interpretation (in a situation in which the boys are not siblings, which
means that we are talking about more than one mother) unless the NP is interpreted
in the scope of a quantifier. Hence, the fact that we can interpret (20) as true in such
a situation provides another piece of evidence for the presence of a covert quantifier in
the semantics of (20).
Dutch is also the source of the next example, which involves a reflexive anaphor.
Unlike English, the Dutch third person reflexive pronoun zichzelf is not inflected for
either number or gender; as (21) demonstrates, zichzelf can be interpreted as ‘himself’,
‘herself’, ‘itself’ or ‘themselves’. This will make Dutch reflexive predication particularly
8Winter (2000) provides an English example along the following lines:
(i) The boys will be glad when their mothers arrive.
ð For every boy x, x will be glad when x’s mother arrives.
However, most varieties of English really need the dependent plural mothers here to bring out the distributive
interpretation, which means it is hard to tell whether the DI here is really due to covert quantification and
not just a special case of the collective interpretation (for “The boys will be glad when the mothers of the
boys arrive” to be true, it is only necessary for the boys to be glad when the mothers arrive, a condition
that is satisfied when each boy is happy to see his own mother). When the singular their mother is used,
most speakers are only able to get a collective interpretation in which the boys are all children of the same
mother. In contrast, Dutch (sometimes) allows dependent plurality but does not require it, so the Dutch
equivalent of “The boys will be glad when their mother arrives” can easily be interpreted both collectively
and distributively.
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Johnny considers / the children consider SELF.3sg/pl rather clever
‘Johnny considers / the children consider himself/themselves rather clever’
When the subject is a plural definite like the children, two different interpretations
arise, depending on whether we take the antecedent of zichzelf to be the entire group
denoted by the subject, or each of the members of that group in turn:
(22) De kinderen vinden zichzelf nogal slim.
‘The children consider themselves rather clever’
a. ð The children consider the children rather clever (as a group). (CI)
b. ð For every child x, x considers itself rather clever. (DI)
In a situation in which each child considers itself clever but thinks the other children
are stupid, (22) is false on its collective interpretation but true on its distributive one.
This interpretation cannot be derived if only the plurality de kinderen ‘the children’
as a whole may function as the antecedent of zichzelf, but it can be derived if we allow
zichzelf to be bound by a quantifier over individual children.
To summarise, while simple distributive sentences like “The children laughed” might
in principle be analysed in terms of direct predication over a collection, the truth
conditions of more complex cases involving scope interactions and binding cannot be
adequately captured without assuming covert quantification by something like a D-
operator.
2.2 Contrasts between plurals and group NPs
In order to enable quantification over the members of a collection, this collection needs
to be associated with a set on the compositional level, since quantifiers (the D-operator
included) by definition only apply to sets. This is relevant because there is a class of
noun phrases that intuitively seem to refer to the same collections as the plural definites
we have been looking at so far, yet are generally taken to denote atomic entities:
singular definites formed with group nouns like team, committee, set, or pile. If it is
true that these group NPs are atomic, we expect them to ‘fail’ the Q-distributivity tests
from the previous section. As we will see, this turns out to be the case: in this section I
will show that none of the relevant sentences has a Q-distributive interpretation when
the subject is a group NP rather than a plural. This result supports both the validity
of our Q-distributivity tests and the atomic analysis of group NPs. In addition, I will
use this contrast between plurals and group nouns to identify two more Q-distributivity
tests.
Finally, I will show that group NPs, despite their incompatibility with Q-distributivity,
do show distributivity effects (as has been recognised in most of the literature on this
topic); this confirms the need for a theory of P-distributivity, without which we would
be unable to account for these observations.
2.2.1 Group denotations as atoms
Group nouns are singular nouns that refer to seemingly plural individuals, such as
committee, team, collection, set, council or group itself. In many contexts, they can





















Group nouns behave like plurals in other respects: they may appear as the argument of
a collective predicate (24), and function as the antecedent of both discourse and bound
plural anaphors ((25b) was found through Google along with many examples like it):9
(24) The committee gathered in the meeting room.
(25) a. The committee debated for two hours before they could agree on a solution.
b. HUD will continue to enforce the Fair Housing Act to ensure that no family
has their housing options limited because of their race.
c. The crew was obviously enjoying themselves and having fun with the script.
In some varieties of English, most notably British English, they may also take plural
agreement:10
(26) This art collective are always dressed in black.
Considerations like these led Bennett (1974) to treat group NPs as pluralities, denoting
the set of the group’s members; however, most researchers afterwards have argued that
groups are not reducible to the set of their members, but are entities in their own right
(Link, 1984; Landman, 1989; Barker, 1992; Schwarzschild, 1996, but see Pearson 2011,
Magri 2012 and de Vries 2015:5 for a different account in the spirit of Bennett). This
is intuitively reasonable: groups have identities, purposes and histories that may be
independent of any properties of the group’s members. In line with this, (27) shows
that while plurals and proper name conjunctions inherit the properties shared by their
members and vice versa (Link, 1983), this does not always happen with groups:
(27) Supposing the women are, and the committee consists of, Lily and Naomi:
a. Lily is old and Naomi is old ô Lily and Naomi are old ô The women are
old.
b. but: Lily is old and Naomi is old öñ The committee is old.
There are several other examples that show that a group NP denotation can be in the
extension of a certain predicate while the plurality formed by conjoining the group’s
members is not, or vice versa; Barker (1992) lists many of them.
(28) a. The committee has two members.
b. *The women/Lily and Naomi have two members.
(29) The women/Lily and Naomi are members of the committee ÷ The committee is
a member of the committee.
9An elicitation study by Bock et al. (2006) found that British and American speakers are equally likely
to follow up a group antecedent with a plural pronoun, regardless of whether the pronoun is bound by the
antecedent or not. Examples (24b) and (24c) were both found on US websites reporting on local news.
Since the ability of group NPs to function as the antecedent of plural pronouns is not limited to a particular
dialect of English, it appears to be unrelated to their ability (in some varieties of the language) to occur
with a plural VP.
10According to Corbett (2000), the same phenomenon is attested in various other languages, like Spanish,
Old Church Slavonic, Samoan, the Brazilian language Paumaŕı and the Caucasian language Kumaxov. My
mother-in-law, who is not a linguist, reported noticing plural agreement with singular group nouns in her
studies of Ancient Greek, for which I found official support in a recent corpus study (Birkenes & Sommer,
2014).
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Data like these suggest that group NPs (like the committee) do not have the same
denotation as the corresponding pluralities (like Lily and Naomi or the members of the
committee).
On independent grounds, Schwarzschild (1996) argues that their denotations must
be atomic. His argument is based on contrasts like the following:
(30) a. Each of the boys is from Texas.
b. *Each of the car was manufactured in the Czech Republic.
c. *Each of the group is from Texas.
(31) a. *Part of the boys is/are from Texas.
b. Part of the car was manufactured in the Czech Republic.
c. Part of the group is from Texas.
In both of these cases, group NPs pattern with singular entities (the car), not with
pluralities (the boys).
For various other empirical arguments that support an analysis of groups as atoms,
see Barker (1992), Schwarzschild (1996), Chierchia (1998); Krifka (2003).11
Link, Barker, Schwarzschild and (up to a point) Landman all conclude that group
NP denotations are atomic: they lack internal structure, their individual members are
inaccessible to the compositional semantics. I will adopt this conclusion; as we will see,
the data discussed in the next section are in line with it, adding more support to the
groups-as-atoms analysis.
2.2.2 Distributivity behaviour of group nouns
Of the examples of Q-distributivity listed in section 2.1, all are unavailable with group
NPs. Below, I repeat the examples, this time with group rather than plural subjects:
(32) The group is walking or cycling.
ö For every group member x, x is walking or x cycling. (DI)
ô The group members are walking or the group members are cycling. (CI)
Recall from the data in (15) that both a distributive and a collective interpretation
are available if the subject is a plural definite. However, if the subject is a group
noun as in (32), only the latter is available. Sentence (32) is not entailed by the
explicitly distributive statement below it, according to which the disjunction walking
or cycling applies to each individual semanticist. It is, however, entailed by the second,
collective statement, according to which the disjunction walking or cycling applies to
the collection of semanticists as a whole: either they are all walking, or they are
all cycling. In section 2.1, I have shown that only this second interpretation can be
analysed in terms of direct predication over a collection; the first must be derived by
means of a D-operator. The data in (32) suggest that this option is unavailable with a
group noun subject.
Our next examples also run parallel to our earlier data in section 2.1, and show a
similar contrast between plurals and group nouns:
(33) The herd/trio of cows won fewer prizes at the fair than the pig.
ö For every cow x, x won fewer prizes than the pig. (DI)
ô The cows together won fewer prizes than the pig. (CI)
11Krifka (2003), citing Barker (1992) and Kleiber (1989), mentions that group nouns seem to be in-
compatible with cardinality predicates such as be numerous or be few, suggesting that groups do not have
countable members, but not everyone seems to agree with this judgement (cf. Champollion (2010:189) and
the analysis of be numerous as an ‘atom predicate’ in Winter (2002).
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(34) The class is hiding somewhere.
ö For every pupil x, there is a place y such that x is hiding in y. (DI)
ô There is a place y such that every pupil is hiding in y. (CI)
(35) This art collective dresses in black one day a week.
ö For every artist x, there is one day a week y such that x dresses in black on y.
(DI)
ô There is one day a week y such that every artist dresses in black on y. (CI)
(36) Groep 8 wordt woedend als je hun moeder beledigt. (Dutch)
‘The 6th grade gets furious when you insult their mother’
ö For every 6th-grader x, x gets furious if you insult x’s mother.
ô The 6th-graders get furious when you insult their mum (the pupils are siblings).
(37) Mijn familie vindt zichzelf nogal slim. (Dutch; compare to (19))
‘My family considers refl.3sg/pl rather clever’
ö For each of my family members x, x considers itself rather clever (DI)12
ô My family considers my family rather clever (as a group). (CI)
In each of these cases, the only available interpretation is the CI (hence, the original
sentence and the CI entail each other); distribution over individual group members is
ruled out. As a consequence, sentence (33) can only be false in the situation depicted
in fig. 1; sentences (34) and (35) must mean that everyone hid in the same place or
dresses in black on the same day; sentence (36) presupposes that the pupils in the sixth
grade are siblings; and finally, sentence (37) can be true even in a situation where my
individual family members do not consider themselves particularly clever, as long as
they feel that our family as a whole is.
The generalisation that emerges is that sentences with group subjects systematically
lack a distributive interpretation that their plural-subject counterparts do have. As
I have argued at the beginning of this section, this is expected under an analysis
in which group NPs are associated with atomic individuals: since Q-distributivity
involves quantifying over the members of a set by means of a D-operator, Q-distributive
interpretations should only be available if the sentence subject denotes a set. The
contrast between (15-20) on the one hand and (30-35) on the other thus supports an
analysis of groups as atoms.13
2.2.3 Further examples of Q-distributivity
The Q-distributivity tests from section 2.1 were based on theory - given standard
assumptions about disjunction, scope, and binding, we expect not to be able to de-
rive distributive interpretations for the sentences involved unless distributivity involves
covert quantification. These expectations are confirmed by the contrast between plural-
subject and group-subject sentences, as summarised by the above generalisation. Now
that we have established that we can diagnose Q-distributivity by checking whether
it is available when the sentence subject is a group NP, we can in turn use this ob-
servation to identify additional Q-distributivity tests involving linguistic phenomena
that different theories have different predictions about, and perhaps use the results to
decide between competing theories (just as our original Q-distributivity tests provided
12According to my judgement, P-distributivity is available with Dutch reflexive predicates. For example,
a psychiatrist might say Deze groep patiënten snijdt zichzelf ‘This group of patients cuts refl.3sg/pl’,
just as an English-speaking psychiatrist might say This group of patients self-harms. However, in a small
clause construction like vinden zichzelf slim ‘consider refl.3sg/pl clever’, that does not involve a single
reflexivised predicate, a distributive interpretation is clearly out.
13In British English, the missing Q-distributive interpretations in (32-35) reappear when the group NPs
appear with a plural VP; related observations are made in Pollard & Sag (1994); Barker (1992). See de
Vries (2013) for an in-depth investigation of this.
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support for an atomic, rather than set-based, analysis of group NPs). In this section,
I will mention two of these, and briefly discuss the theoretical implications.
Proportionality modifiers. The first of these examples is from Dutch, where the
adverb gedeeltelijk ‘partly’ modifies the telic predicate kaalgeschoren ‘shaved bald’ to
indicate that the shaving-bald event was only partly completed:
(38) De studenten zijn gedeeltelijk kaalgeschoren. (Dutch)
The students are partly bald.shaven
‘The students were partly shaved bald’
a. ð Part of the students have been shaven bald. (CI)
b. ð Every student has been shaven partly bald. (DI)
If we take the group of students as a whole to be the incremental theme of the shaving-
bald event, and this event was only partially completed, we get the collective inter-
pretation according to which a part of the students were shaven bald. If we quantify
over individual students, we get a partially completed shaving-bald event for each of
them, resulting in the distributive interpretation according to which every student is
now partly bald.
There is a possible objection to this, however. Perhaps the DI simply entails the
CI in this case: a situation in which every student is shaved partly bald might be
interpreted as a partially completed shaving-bald event involving the entire group, so
the collective interpretation of sentence (38) would be verified in such a situation.
However, when we compare the entailment pattern in (38) to that of its group-subject
counterpart, we see that this cannot be the case:
(39) Het dispuut is gedeeltelijk kaalgeschoren. (Dutch)
The fraternity is partly bald.shaven
‘The fraternity was partly shaved bald’
a. ô Part of the students have been shaven bald. (CI)
b. ö Every student has been shaven partly bald. (DI)
If the collective interpretation - a partially completed shaving-bald event with the entire
fraternity as its theme - could be verified by a distributive situation in which each of the
students has been partly shaved, we would expect (39) to have precisely the same range
of interpretations as (38). However, in the case of (39), a distributive interpretation
is clearly out: unlike (38), it is false in the described situation.14 This shows that (a)
we do need to derive the DI in (38b) as a separate (Q-distributive) reading, and (b)
however we analyse adverbs like ‘partially’, we should take into account the fact that
its behaviour depends on the semantic number of the sentence subject.
VP conjunction. Another Q-distributivity test that I have not discussed in section
2.1 is VP conjunction, which shows a contrast between plural and group subjects that
is very similar to the disjunction data:
(40) a. The women are short and tall.
b. # The committee is short and tall.
While (40a) is acceptable to many speakers, and is interpreted as equivalent to ‘part
of the women are short, the other part of the women are tall’, this non-Boolean in-
terpretation seems to be out for (40b). The only interpretation available for (40b) is
an intersective one according to which each member of the committee is (impossibly)
both short and tall, which makes the sentence anomalous.
14I have checked this with several native speakers of Dutch, who all shared my intuitions about these
sentences.
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The issue of non-Boolean VP conjunction has received some attention in the liter-
ature (e.g. Krifka, 1990; Winter, 2001; Poortman, 2014). The contrast between plural
and group subjects, however, seems to have gone unnoticed so far. It is unexpected
under Krifka’s account, which is explicitly designed to capture both (40a) and the
non-Boolean interpretation of (41) with a single analysis:
(41) The flag is green and white.
Krifka posits an interpretation rule according to which sentences like (40a) and (41) are
true if the subject denotation can be partitioned in such a way that the first predicate
holds of one partition and the second predicate holds of the other one. Since the rule
must be able to account for (41), it needs to be defined for both plural and singular
entities. This predicts that the atomic entity corresponding to the committee should
be able to be similarly partitioned into a short part and a tall part, which means that
(40b) should be completely equivalent to (40a). However, we have seen that this is not
the case.
The account in Winter (2001) is better equipped to deal with the plural/group
contrast, since it only works on pluralities (Winter analyses singular predicate con-
junctions like (41) as an independent phenomenon, following Lasersohn 1995). Under
this account, the strong, Boolean meaning of (40a) is basic, but it is weakened under
the influence of lexical knowledge that tells us that being short and being tall are mu-
tually exclusive. The actual interpretation, then, will be the strongest interpretation
compatible with this lexical knowledge - i.e., an interpretation according to which each
of the women is either short or tall.15
As a Q-distributivity test, the VP conjunction test functions much the same as the
disjunction test: since the non-Boolean interpretation can only be derived when the
subject is a plurality, (40a), but not (40b), is true in a situation where part of the
women is short while the rest is tall.
2.3 P-distributivity
All this does not mean, however, that group-subject sentences may never receive a
distributive interpretation. The sentences in (42) show that group nouns, like plurals,
allow both collective and distributive interpretations:
(42) a. The class
$&
%
gathered in the garden.
met last week.











15Essentially, we can view plural predication as expressing a relation between two sets - a set of entities
and a set of properties - where the Boolean interpretation can be expressed by universal quantification over
both of these sets, as follows:
(ii) rrThe women are short and tallss = 1 iff @xx, P y P woman tshort, tallu : P pxq
In order to derive the non-Boolean interpretation, we can ‘chip away’ at the Cartesian product of woman
and {short,tall} by removing ordered pairs until it is compatible with our lexical knowledge - for example,
this weakened relation may contain either the pair xw1, shorty or the pair xw1, tally, but not both. The
result is a set of new, weakened relations with the mutual exclusivity of short and tall taken into account;
the ‘Extended Strongest Meaning Hypothesis’ states that the strongest of these relations (i.e. the maximal
subsets of woman  {short,tall} that are still compatible with our lexical knowledge) are used in evaluating
the truth of the sentence.
For our purposes, the precise workings of the ESMH are not important - the important thing is that the
above procedure is only defined for predication over pluralities, not for singular predication. This means
that the same mechanism cannot be applied to derive a non-Boolean interpretation for (40b).
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Following the argument made in the previous section and our conclusion that group
NP denotations are atomic, this means that distributive interpretations like the ones in
(42b) cannot be based on covert quantification over group members. The distributivity
effects in (42b), then, have to be lexical in nature: the behaviour of group NPs makes
clear that a formal, operator-based account of distributivity alone is not sufficient to
cover the full range of distributivity data, and provides empirical support for the no-
tion of P-distributivity. In this section, we will further explore this notion by trying
to capture the lexical inferences underlying P-distributivity using pseudo-equivalences
(following ?), a kind of meaning postulates that hardwire the distributive properties
of the predicate into its lexical entry, while leaving room for various nuances based on
context and world knowledge.
Recall that, in our present approach, there is no formal semantic difference between
collectivity and P-distributivity: they are modelled using precisely the same compo-
sitional mechanism. Rather, the distinction between the two is entirely lexical: both
collectivity and P-distributivity are rooted in the lexical semantics of the predicate and
our reasoning about parts and wholes with respect to the predicate meaning. Hence, as
we have already seen, The team laughed receives a distributive interpretation, The class
is a good team a collective one, and The family gathered is collective with respect to
the predicate as a whole but distributive with respect to certain parts of the predicate
meaning.
In principle, there are various ways we can go about formalising this idea, which
should strike a balance between two extremes. One extreme is a completely lexicon-
based approach, in which all possible collective and distributive inferences are listed as
part of a predicate’s lexical entry (for example, in the form of meaning postulates). The
other extreme is an approach fully based on context, in which the lexical semantics of
the relevant predicates is underspecified with respect to the way its meaning pertains
to individual parts of the collections it applies to, and contextual/pragmatic factors
like world knowledge and discourse goals are left to fill in the blanks. I will briefly
discuss some reasons why the best approach is likely to be located somewhere in the
middle - not as flexible as the pragmatic approach, but not as rigid as the fully lexical
approach either.
2.3.1 Support for a lexicon-based approach: stubborn distributivity
While lexical semantics is of course closely related to world knowledge in the sense that
words and their meanings enable us to express things about the world, it is not merely
a way of capturing world knowledge a bit more formally. The lexical semantics of a
word may impose restrictions on its meaning that do not seem to have anything to do
with our understanding of how the world works, and this also holds for the availability
of P-distributivity effects. As Schwarzschild (2009) observes, some predicates do not
seem to be vague between a collective and a distributive interpretation, even though
this might very well be possible according to our knowledge of the world. For example,
according to Schwarzschild’s judgements, sentence (43a) has no interpretation under
which it means the same as (43b), and vice versa:
(43) a. The boxes are large.
b. The collection of boxes is large.
According to Schwarzschild, sentence (43b) can only mean that the collection itself
is large, not that the boxes that make up the collection are. Sentence (43a) has the
opposite meaning: it can only be used to express that the individual boxes are large,
not that the boxes together are (compare The boxes take up a lot of space, which means
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roughly the same but does have a collective interpretation in addition to a distributive
one). For this reason, Schwarzschild calls predicates like large ‘stubbornly distributive’.
Stubbornly distributive predicates are relevant to our present discussion because
world knowledge tells us that largeness can be a property of individuals as well as
collections, so if collective and P-distributive inferences were a matter of applying
world knowledge to a lexically underspecified predication structure, we would expect
both inferences to be available with large. The fact that this does not seem to be the
case shows that an approach to P-distributivity that is fully based on pragmatic factors
like context and world knowledge leads to overgeneration. A property like stubborn
distributivity needs to be made explicit in the lexical semantics of large (but not take
up a lot of space) in such a way that the plural/group contrast in (43) follows.
2.3.2 Support for a pragmatic approach
On the other hand, it can be shown that pragmatic reasoning does influence the avail-
ability of certain inferences from wholes to parts, which supports an analysis in which
these inferences are not fully lexically specified. A commonly made argument for the
involvement of pragmatic factors involves sentences like the following:
(44) a. The shoes cost 50. (Lasersohn, 1995; Schwarzschild, 1996; Champollion,
2010)
b. The new collection costs 50.
The most natural interpretation of (44a) is that the relevant shoes cost 50 a pair -
an ‘intermediate’ (neither collective nor fully distributive) interpretation facilitated
by our knowledge of the world, in which shoes are usually bought in pairs. While the
intermediate interpretation of sentences like (44a) is usually invoked in arguments about
the various properties of the D-operator (i.e., in discussions of Q-distributivity), the
fact that this interpretation is also available for (44b) if it is uttered in the same shoe-
shopping context shows that pragmatic factors influence P-distributive interpretations
as well.
2.3.3 Pseudo-equivalences
In Scha (1981), the derivation of distributive and collective interpretations is governed
by meaning postulates on the predicate, for example:
(45) walkpXq (where X is a non-singleton set) is interpreted as @x P Xrwalkpxqs
A more recent version of Scha’s meaning postulates approach can be found in ?. Winter
and Scha propose a pseudo-formalisation of P-distributivity using pseudo-equivalences,
which are non-logical and context-sensitive equivalences (written with a squiggly arrow
ú) between pairs of statements, designed to capture the lexical semantics of certain
expressions. Just as the sentence pairs in (46a) and (46b) are pseudo-equivalent, so are
the pairs in (47):
(46) a. The table is white.ú Every part of the table is white.
b. The machine is broken.ú Some part of the machine is broken.
(47) a. The boys are tall.ú Every boy is tall.
b. The books touch the ceiling.ú Some book touches the ceiling.
I will take Winter and Scha’s pseudo-equivalences as my starting point, but make some
adjustments to their form for several reasons. First, Winter and Scha do not address
‘mixed’ predicates, that may be interpreted both distributively and collectively (note
that this distinction cannot be captured in terms of quantificational force; a non-
maximally distributive interpretation like (47b) is still distributive. See also Landman
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1996). But the existence of mixed predicates has always formed a problem for an
approach to collectivity and distributivity based on meaning postulates (Roberts, 1987;
Hoeksema, 1988), since it presumably means that those meaning postulates are only
optional and that we need additional factors to determine whether they apply in a given
context or not; this robs the theory of much of its explanatory power. Second, even
though Winter and Scha tell us that their pseudo-equivalences are context-sensitive,
nothing about the way they are formulated makes explicit how this might happen, since
they do not include any contextually-defined variables. If we want our analysis to make
any verifiable predictions about the way contextual factors influence the interpretation
of predicates, we need to be more formally explicit about this.
At the end of this section, we will have built a general template for the pseudo-
equivalences that govern the kind of part-whole inferencing that (P-)distributivity and
collectivity are the result of, that takes into account both the previous two points and
our discussion in sections 2.3.1 and ?? above.
Let’s start with the challenge provided by mixed predicates. Many predicates, like win
and vote in favour, are vague between a collective and distributive interpretation, or -
given the right context - fall somewhere in between, as in the shoes example above:
(48) a. Five boy/girl pairs played a game of chess against each other. (Each of) the
girls won.
b. Five girls played a football match against five boys. (*Each of) the girls won.
(49) The councillors voted in favour of the proposal.
a. ð Each of the councillors voted in favour.
a. ð The majority of the councillors voted in favour (i.e. the proposal got
enough yes-votes to pass).
However, the above interpretations could all follow from a pseudo-equivalence like (50)
if we allow for different contextually salient granularities in deciding what counts as the
‘parts’ of a collection (cf. Verkuyl & van der Does, 1996, who argue that the difference
between collectivity and distributivity is more quantitative than qualitative).16
(50) Template for pseudo-equivalences (captures collective and distributive
interpretations of mixed predicates)
P pXqú @xrx is a salient part of X Ñ P pxqs (where X is a collection17)
Consider the predicate cost 50 euros. In an ordinary clothing shop, where shoes are
priced and sold in pairs, a partitioning of ‘the shoes’ into pairs of shoes might be the
most contextually salient; but if the shop is going out of business and selling its entire
inventory in bulk, the most contextually salient partitioning of ‘the shoes’ might be
one in which it has just a single part, namely the entire collection of shoes. By allowing
a collection to count as a part of itself, the collective interpretation of (49) could be
captured by the context-sensitive application of the meaning postulate in (50).
Salient partitionings also appear to be relevant for certain non-maximally distribu-
tive interpretations, where a smaller subpart of a collection functions to ‘represent’ the
collection as a whole. For example, whether the sentence “The girls are touching the
ceiling” is true depends very much on the way the girls are grouped together in the
context - if they are forming a human pyramid together, it is sufficient for just the girl
at the top to be touching the ceiling, but if they are all in different locations, it is more
16Compare also Schwarzschild’s (1996) cover-based approach to (Q-)distributivity and Champollion’s
(2010) claim that Q-distributivity is usually atomic, while P-distributivity can easily distribute over larger
non-atomic partitionings.
17Recall that ‘collection’ is our pre-theoretical term for any NP denotation that is conceptually plural,
i.e. that refers to a collection of entities or objects (see footnote 6).
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likely that we will only judge the sentence as true if each of the girls is touching the
ceiling independently (cf. observations in Lasersohn, 1990). Similarly, a sentence like
“The reporters asked the president questions” can be true if only a few of the individual
reporters actually asked a question (Dowty 1987), because it is easy to regard a group
of reporters at a press conference in terms of their collective function, rather than as
a collection of salient individuals (and the non-maximal interpretation becomes more
and more difficult the more the reporters are individuated).
But salience of the partitioning is not the only factor influencing the interpretation -
there is, of course, also the contribution of the predicate itself. The pseudo-equivalence
in (50) fails to capture, for example, the difference between collectively winning and
‘collectively’ touching the ceiling. If a football team wins a match, this is a truly col-
lective property of the team as a whole: individual players can’t win football matches.
But when a human pyramid touches the ceiling, one of the individuals in the pyra-
mid is touching the ceiling on everyone’s behalf. While we can say that “the girls are
touching the ceiling” if the girls as a whole form a salient group, touch the ceiling is
still a distributive predicate, a property of individuals rather than collections. In order
to capture this, we need a slightly different template from the on given in (50):
(51) Template for pseudo-equivalences (captures maximal and non-maximal
P-distributivity)
P pXqú @xrx is a salient part of X Ñ Dy ¤ xrP pyqss
So, while the mixed predicate to win is lexically associated with a pseudo-equivalence
like the one in (50), the purely distributive to touch the ceiling is associated with
the template of the form (51), according to which saying that a predicate P holds of a
collection X amounts to saying that every salient part of X contains an entity to which
P applies (note that I am using ¤ here, not P, since the pseudo-equivalence should be
applicable to collections that correspond to atomic entities in the formal semantics).
To sum up, the ‘salient part’ requirement captures the way contextual factors are
involved in the interpretation of predicates as (non-)maximally P-distributive or col-
lective. While salient partitionings are important for all predicates, the availability of
different pseudo-equivalence templates reflects the observation that different predicates
impose different requirements upon these salient parts: they can either be agents or
contain an agent. Of course, the templates may be dressed up with further lexical in-
formation to capture other particularities of individual predicates, such as the fact that
certain subproperties of the predicate gather do distribute to all individual members
of the subject collection (see Dowty 1987 for many excellent observations related to
subentailments and what it means to ‘take part’ in a given event). And some predicates
may not have pseudo-equivalences associated with them at all (such as the stubbornly
distributive ones discussed in section 2.3.1).
2.4 Intermediate conclusion
In the first half of this paper, I have argued that distributivity effects can be derived in
two different ways: either by context-based reasoning about parts and wholes in relation
to a predicate meaning (P-distributivity), or by covert quantification over members of
a collection (Q-distributivity). While P-distributivity is available with singular group
NPs like my family or the team, Q-distributivity is limited to actual pluralities: in
order to be able to quantify over members of a collection, those members need to be
accessible to the compositional semantics. I have shown that the contrast between
group NPs and plurals supports an analysis of groups as atoms, in line with Barker
(1992) and Schwarzschild (1996) (but see author (2013, 2015) for a more nuanced view
on this).
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3 Polyadic P-distributivity with non-quantificational
indefinites
In the previous section of this paper, I have analysed group NPs as atom-denoting, and
argued that this accounts for the fact that Q-distributivity is unavailable in sentences
with a group subject. However, there seems to be one exception to this generalisation.
Consider the following sentence, which involves an indefinite object:
(52) The boys ate a pizza.
a. ð There is a pizza x such that the boys ate x. (CI)
b. ð For each boy y, there is a pizza x such that y ate x. (DI)
Sentences like (52), which have a distributive interpretation according to which the
boys ate a pizza each, have been used by e.g. Winter (1997); Brisson (1998); Magri
(2012) in support of a quantificational, operator-based account of distributivity. If the
indefinite a pizza is analysed as a quantifier and there are no other quantificational
elements in the sentence, a pizza will necessarily take scope over the entire sentence.
This results in a collective interpretation of (52) according to which a pizza was eaten
by the boys together, but it does not account for the distributive interpretation: for
this, Winter and Brisson reason, we need an additional quantifier over individual boys
that can take scope over a pizza.
Based on the generalisation proposed in the previous section (plurals allow Q-
distributivity, group nouns do not), then, we expect the group-subject counterpart
of (52) to lack a DI. However, this expectation is not borne out: sentence (53) is just
as ambiguous as sentence (52).
(53) The team ate a pizza.
a. ð There is a pizza x such that the team ate x. (CI)
b. ð For each team member y, there is a pizza x such that y ate x. (DI)
The lack of contrast between (52) and (53) seems to provide a counterargument to the
atomic analysis of group NPs as argued for here. Since this particular analysis lay at
the basis of the more general empirical argument in favour of the P/Q distinction, we
may suspect that the data in (53) affects the validity of this conclusion, too.18 The
apparent Q-distributivity over group nouns also happens with numerical indefinites;
examples like (55) seem to be fine in all varieties of English I have encountered:
(54) This batallion received four insignia. (CI/DI)
Finally, group distributivity is available with both direct and indirect indefinite objects:
(55) The children in Group A and Group B each made an origami animal. Group A
gave the animal to a teacher, Group B gave it to a parent. (CI/DI)
How to account for this apparent exception to the generalisation established in section
2.2? In principle, we have two ways out. The first is to reconsider the analysis of
groups as atoms and claim that in cases like the above, the individual group members
18The truth-value judgements for (52) and (53) are complicated by the fact that many English speakers
cannot get a distributive interpretation for either of these sentences unless the object is a dependent plural
(“The boys ate pizzas”). However, all of my informants who accept a singular in the case of (52) also accept
one in the case of (53). And in Dutch, where dependent plurality is optional but the singular is preferred,
the equivalent of (53) is unproblematic:
(54) De jongens aten een pizza. (CI/DI)
The boys ate-pl a pizza
‘The boys ate a pizza’
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are accessible to the semantics, perhaps because group denotations can shift to plu-
ralities under certain circumstances. Such a shift is proposed by Landman (1989) for
independent reasons.19 This line is pursued by Magri (2012), who mentions the dis-
tributive interpretation of sentences like (53-55) in support of his claim that group NPs
denote sets rather than atoms. While this solution would account for the above data,
it would also render the general pattern (as identified in section 2.2.2) inexplicable, so
going down this road creates more problems than it solves.
The second way out is to claim that there is something special about indefinites.
It is this approach that I will develop here: I will argue that the indefinite in (54) and
(55) should be analysed as a property rather than a quantifier, which - for a certain
class of predicates - enables direct predication over the indefinite and, by that means,
P-distributivity over the instances of the property it denotes. This means that the
distributive interpretation of sentence (55) (and possibly also (54)) can be regarded as
a case of two-place P-distributivity, comparable to the analysis of codistributivity in
Scha (1981) and Winter (2000).
3.1 Analysis: P-distributivity beyond unary predicates
While the examples of P-distributivity we have seen so far all involved intransitive
predicates, with distribution over a single argument, there is no a priori reason that
would limit P-distributivity to only one argument. Just as we can analyse sentence
(56a) in terms of direct predication (as in (56b)), we can analyse a sentence like (56c)
as a relation between two collections (as in (56d); see Scha 1981, Winter 2000). And
just as (56b) is vague with respect to the involvement of particular individuals, (56d)
is vague with respect to the particular relations: we cannot tell if all the boys and all
the girls were involved in the kissing, how many boys were kissed by each of the girls
or how many girls kissed each of the boys, but we do know that individual boys were
kissed by individual girls.
(56) a. The girls laughed.
b. laugh(the girls)
c. The girls kissed the boys.
d. kiss(the girls,the boys)
In order to be able to extend this analysis to cases of group distributivity with indefinite
objects, we cannot analyse the indefinite as a generalised quantifier with existential
force. Because there is no quantifier over group members, an existential quantifier
19Landman proposes an operator Ó that shifts group noun denotations to their corresponding pluralities
(the set of the group’s members). According to Landman, we need this operator to account for data like
(iii):
(iiii) The Talking Heads are pop stars.
In Landman’s analysis, the predicate are pop stars is a predicate over plural entities, which would lead to a
mismatch with the group-denoting The Talking Heads unless the latter is able to shift into a plurality. But
note that this only works (at least in American English) if the group name is morphologically plural:
(iv) a. ??The Cure are pop stars.
b. *The committee are good managers.
The contrast between (iii) and (iv) suggests that only groups with a morphologically plural name may
denote pluralities. But in that case, we cannot be sure that we are actually dealing with groups: The
Talking Heads might be an ordinary plural definite that denotes a plurality of entities, each of them a
Talking Head. So there seems to be little reason to enrich our semantics with an operation that shifts atoms
to their corresponding sets (at least based on these data).
In any case, the Ó-operator does not seem central to Landman’s account of group semantics, which is
otherwise compatible with an atomic approach to groups.
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introduced by the indefinite would necessarily take scope over the whole group, yielding
(for example) (57b) as the only possible interpretation of (57a):
(57) a. The First Aid team is wearing an orange vest.
b. There is an orange vest such that the First Aid team is wearing it. (CI)
I propose that the indefinite in (57a) and similar sentences denotes a property, which
I will treat here as something very similar to a group - a higher-order individual that
allows P-distributivity over its individual instantiations. Thus, just as the verb in (56c)
denotes a relation between two pluralities, it denotes a relation between a property and
a group in (57a); and just as with (56c), any inferences about individual members of
the group or individual instances of the property are due to P-distributivity, not based
on quantification. I will refer to P-distributivity over multiple arguments as polyadic
P-distributivity (or binary P-distributivity, in the case of transitive verbs).
Neither the idea of property-denoting indefinites nor the idea of polyadic P-distributivity
is new. The latter was already assumed in Scha (1981) and empirically motivated (al-
though not very explicitly) in Winter (2000); the former are the subject of a growing
body of semantic literature. While classical Montagovian semantics treats indefinite
noun phrases as generalised quantifiers with existential force, non-quantificational anal-
yses of indefinites have been proposed at least since Milsark (1974) and Carlson (1977),
in which they can denote properties or kinds (respectively), and the work of Kamp
(1981) and Heim (1982), in which they are associated with free variables. McNally
(1992) and Zimmermann (1993) propose that indefinites may be interpreted as prop-
erties (of type xe, ty) even in argument positions, and this idea has subsequently been
used to account for a wide range of semantic phenomena.
McNally (1992) discusses property-type indefinites in relation to there-sentences,
arguing that the traditional distinction between weak and strong NPs of Milsark (1974)
can be reduced to the distinction between property-type and quantificational NPs.
de Hoop (1996) makes use of property-type indefinites in her analysis of light verb
constructions like take a walk or have a drink. Zimmermann (1993, 2006) proposes that
opaque verbs like seek take property-type arguments. Van Geenhoven (1998) links the
property analysis of indefinites to the syntactic phenomenon of noun incorporation,
proposing a semantic counterpart of this operation that is also argued for in Farkas
& de Swart (2003) and Chung & Ladusaw (2004), among others. Mador-Haim &
Winter (2007, 2015) show that, given standard assumptions about the semantics of
PPs, assuming that indefinites may denote properties accounts for the observation
that the indefinite in “We are far from a gas station” is interpreted universally (‘far
from all gas stations’).
A recurring question in the literature on property-type expressions in argument
positions is how they compose with the predicate. After all, there seems to be a type
mismatch between the argument (which is of type xe, ty) and the predicate function
(which wants an entity). In principle, there are three ways to go about this. We might
assume some special operation that composes verbs and property-type arguments (e.g.
Chung & Ladusaw’s Restrict or Van Geenhoven’s Semantic Incorporation). Alterna-
tively, we might adopt an operation that shifts the property into either a quantifier
(e.g., a generic operator or the A typeshift from Partee 1987)20 or the property’s entity
correlate (Chierchia, 1984, 1985; McNally, 1992; Mueller-Reichau, 2006; McNally, 2009)
so that it can compose with the predicate by ordinary function application. The third
option does not make use of any special formal operations, but assumes that (certain)
transitive verbs are ambiguous between an ‘ordinary’ version (type xe, ety) that wants
an entity complement, and an ‘incorporating’ version (type xet, ety) that wants a prop-
erty (Dayal e.g. 2003; leBruyn et al. e.g. 2015; compare also Zimmermann’s (1993,2006)
20Thanks to an anonymous NALS reviewer for pointing out this option, which I had overlooked.
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analysis of opaque verbs like seek).
For our present purposes, the third option seems to be most appropriate. The first
and second options work very well for languages in which predicates systematically and
productively combine with property-type complements, but as we will see, the class of
predicates that pattern with wear an orange vest in allowing distributive interpretations
with group NP subjects is actually rather small. Since this suggests that it is mainly
the predicate that determines whether a property-type interpretation is available for
the object, the second option - which operates directly on the object, independently
from the predicate - does not seem a feasible approach. But the first approach will also
overgenerate unless we find a way to restrict its application to just the relevant class of
predicates. This leaves the third, ambiguity-based option as the easiest way to get the
semantics right for the appropriate predicates, while making sure that this derivation
is not available to predicates that do not allow binary P-distributivity when applied to
an indefinite and a group NP.
3.2 ‘Incorporation’ predicates
The fact that not all predicates are equally compatible with the group-distributive
interpretations on which the present analysis is based (something that was first pointed
out to me by Roger Schwarzschild (p.c.); the example in (58b) is due to an anonymous
Natural Language Semantics reviewer) becomes apparent when we compare our earlier
pizza- and orange vest-examples with the following:
(58) a. The football team married a supermodel.
ô There exists a supermodel x such that the football team married x. (CI)
ö For each member of the football team y, there exists a supermodel x such
that y married x. (DI)
b. The class is hiding behind a tree.
ô There is a tree y such that the class is hiding behind y. (CI) ö For
each pupil in the class x, there exists a tree y such that x is hiding behind
y. (DI)
The transitive predicates with which a distributive interpretation is easily available are
predicates like wear, eat, drink, read, buy, make, give, and receive; this seems quite
similar to the class of predicates that may select for bare complements in languages
like Norwegian, Spanish, Catalan, Romanian, and Greek (all languages that do not
ordinarily allow nominals to appear without an article). Such bare complements are
widely assumed to be property-denoting. Here are some examples (via leBruyn et al.,
2015):
(59) Forouse frako. (Greek; Alexandropoulou 2013)
wear.3SG frock-coat
‘S/he was wearing a frock coat’
(60) Han striker genser. (Norwegian; Borthen 2003)
He-is knitting sweater
‘He is knitting a sweater’
(61) M’acabo de comprar cotxe. (Catalan; Espinal & McNally 2011)
REFL-finish.1SG of buy car
‘I’ve just bought myself a car’
Based on the existing literature, leBruyn et al. (2015) conclude that predicates that
allow bare complements in these languages - which they call ‘incorporation verbs’ - fall
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into the following classes:21
(62) a. consumption verbs (e.g. to eat, to smoke)
b. creation verbs (e.g. to write, to build)
c. transfer/transaction verbs (e.g. to receive, to buy)
d. ownership/possession verbs (e.g. to have, to own, to want, to look for)
e. usage verbs (e.g. to use, to wear)
If these predicates show up as a special class in language after language, there might be
something universally special about their semantics - something that might also show
up in languages that do not allow bare nominals, like English and Dutch. The group
distributivity data confirm this: according to my intuitions (which are shared by the
other native speakers of Dutch I consulted), there are very clear contrasts between the
distributivity behaviour of predicates that fall into one of the classes in (62) and those
that do not. For example, the (a) and (b) sentences in (63-64) both involve a group
subject and an indefinite object, but while the (a) sentences can easily be interpreted
distributively, only a collective interpretation is available for the (b) sentences:
(63) a. Na het Io Vivat sloeg het dispuut een pitcher bier achterover. (CI/DI)
after the Io Vivat knock the fraternity a jug beer backwards
‘After the Io Vivat, the fraternity knocked back a jug of beer.’
b. Na het Io Vivat besproeide het dispuut een eerstejaars met bier. (only CI)
after the Io Vivat sprayed the fraternity a freshman with beer
‘After the Io Vivat, the fraternity doused a freshman with beer.’
(64) a. Het korfbalteam heeft een foldertje over doping gekregen. (CI/DI)
the korfball.team has a leaflet about doping received
‘The korfball team received a leaflet about doping.’
b. Het korfbalteam heeft een foldertje over doping boven de bar gehangen. (only
CI)
The korfball.team has a leaflet about doping above the bar put.up
‘The korfball team put up a leaflet about doping above the bar.’
(65) a. Groep 8 heeft een giraffe geboetseerd. (CI/DI)
Group 8 has a giraffe sculpted
‘The 6th grade has sculpted a giraffe.’
b. Groep 8 heeft een giraffe verzorgd. (only CI)
Group 8 has a giraffe cared.for
‘The 6th grade has taken care of a giraffe.’
The picture in 3.2 represents the judgements of 20 Dutch speakers on the availability
of group-distributive interpretations with these and other sentences. The underlined
predicates correspond to Le Bruyn et al.’s incorporation verbs (two from each of the
five classes in (62). The other predicates lack this property. We see that the incor-
poration verbs, despite being syntactically indistinguishable from the other predicates,
all cluster at the top end of the scale22, which means a group-distributive interpreta-
21Following e.g.Borthen (2003) and Espinal & McNally (2011), and using insights from the literature on
relational nouns and from Qualia Theory (Pustejovsky, 1995), leBruyn et al. (2015) argue that the common
property of these predicates is that they all incorporate the semantics of have as their formal backbone; for
each predicate, this basic have-semantics is dressed up with that predicate’s particular (implicit) argument
structure. The semantics they propose for incorporation verbs is somewhat more elaborate than the one I
will use in this chapter, but it is fully compatible with the data and analysis presented here.
22An apparent exception is bezitten ‘to own/possess’, which does not score much better than most of the
non-incorporation verbs, but since these judgements were acquired rather informally on the basis of just a
single sentence per verb, it is hard to say whether there is something odd about bezitten or whether its low
position on the scale is just an artefact.
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tion was available to most speakers. In contrast, most informants felt that a group-
distributive interpretation was not available for non-incorporation predicates like in het
schuurtje zetten ‘to put in the shed’, ten huwelijk vragen ‘to propose to’ or verbranden
‘to burn’. To sum up, the judgements on Dutch suggest that binary P-distributivity
Figure 2: A visual representation of the aggregate judgements from 20 native Dutch speakers
on the availability of a group-distributive interpretation for 20 different transitive verbs
with an indefinite object. (Judgements were provided for the Dutch equivalents of these
predicates. The intended group-distributive interpretations for each sentence were given in
the form of a paraphrase, and informants were asked whether or not the sentence could be
interpreted in that way. The different response options are given on the y-axis.)
over group subjects and indefinite objects is available only with predicates that select
for a property-type complement.23 In the remainder of this section, I will provide a
formal semantics for these predicates that, combined with a lexical semantics captured
by pseudo-equivalences, accounts for the observed P-distributivity effects.
3.3 Formal analysis
I will assume that languages like English and Dutch (that do not allow bare singu-
lars) may derive a property denotation for full NPs by typeshifting quantifiers into
properties, for example using the BE typeshift from Partee (1987):
(66) BEpQq  tx|txu P Qu24
23I do not expect the native speaker judgements on comparable English data to be much different; English
speakers may prefer a dependent plural over a singular indefinite, but that preference will affect all sentences
equally, preserving the difference between the two classes of predicates.
24For example, if Q is the generalised quantifier corresponding to an orange vest, the set Q will consist
of all sets that include at least one orange vest as a member. It follows that if the set is a singleton, its
member will necessarily be an orange vest. The set BEpQq includes all the members of the singletons in Q,
so assuming that all orange vests in the universe have at least one property that they do not share with any
other orange vest, BEpQq will end up equivalent to precisely the set of orange vests.
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Further, I will assume the following semantics for the ‘incorporation’ entries of predi-
cates like wear and eat, with an interpretation that is related to their regular xe, ety
type entries by a pseudo-equivalence similar to the ones we have seen in section 2.3.3:
(67) RIV xet,ety = λPetλXerRIV pX,P qsú
@xrx is a salient part of X Ñ DyrP pyq^Rregpx, yqss
where RIV is the incorporating version of a predicate and Rreg its regular version,
and X is a collection.25
What the pseudo-equivalence says is the following. Asserting that a proposition derived
by applying an incorporating predicate RIV to a property P and a collection X is true,
amounts to asserting that every salient part of X is R-ing some member of the set P .
For example, eatIV (the team,(BE(a pizza)) is true if every salient part of the team
is in an eatreg relation with a member of the set pizza. As in section 2.3.3, the ‘salient
part’ requirement leaves room for various contextual factors to influence which parts
of X the predicate is P-distributed over, such that the eventual interpretation may be
distributive, collective or intermediate.
The semantics and pseudo-equivalence template in (67) are not very sophisticated,
but suffice for our present purposes. See for example Dayal (2003); Espinal & Mc-
Nally (2011); leBruyn et al. (2015) for more detailed proposals on the semantics of
incorporation predicates.
4 Additional evidence for a property analysis
4.1 Underspecification versus ambiguity26
In the present analysis, polyadic P-distributivity is analysed as a relation between mul-
tiple collections and/or properties that is underspecified with respect to the relations
that hold between particular members or instantiations of these arguments. As I have
already argued, this means that the difference between P-distributivity and collectivity
is a matter of vagueness, not ambiguity.
Now that I have hypothesised that P-distributivity is not limited to one-place pred-
icates, we can put this hypothesis to the test by using a well-known ambiguity test: VP
ellipsis. The examples in (68) show how VP ellipsis can distinguish underspecification
from ambiguity:
(68) a. Sue is tall and her baby daughter is, too.
b. An American flag was hanging in front of every building, and a Dutch flag
was, too.
c. Mary went to the bank and Sue did, too.
Sentence (68a) can be true even if the criteria for tallness are quite different for an adult
woman than they are for babies: tall is underspecified with regard to the precise degree
of tallness required, and nothing stops both conjuncts from using a different standard
of comparison (Sue is tall because her height exceeds the average for adult women, her
daughter might be tiny compared to Sue, but can still be called ‘tall’ because she is
tall compared to other babies in her age group). In (68b), on the other hand, it is
not possible to assign different interpretations to both conjuncts: if we interpret the
first conjunct with surface scope, we have to interpret the second conjunct with surface
scope as well, and the same goes for the inverse scope reading. Lexical ambiguity can
be distinguished from vagueness in the same way: example (68c) cannot be used if
25I have chosen purely for convenience to represent ‘collections’ as entities here, but see footnote 6 for
some other options.
26Thanks to Lucas Champollion (p.c.) for pointing out this issue and the VP-ellipsis test to me.
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Mary went to the kind of bank where one does one’s money-related business while Sue
went for a walk along the river. Assuming that VP ellipsis is only possible if the second
conjuncts semantically parallels the first, this means that lexical meaning and scope
ambiguities should be reflected in the logical form of a sentence, while standards of
comparison should not.
If the distinction between P-distributivity and collectivity is like the distinction
between tall-for-an-adult and tall-for-a-baby, we expect to be able to assign different
interpretations to the conjuncts of a VP ellipsis structure. If, on the other hand, the
distinction is a matter of structural or lexical ambiguity, we expect that both conjuncts
should receive the same interpretation: either both collective, or both distributive. The
example in (69) and its Dutch equivalent in (70) suggests that the first option is the
right one:
(69) The adults had a pizza and the children did too. Only the children had to share
a pizza with each other, while the adults each got their own.
(70) De volwassenen hebben een pizza gegeten en de kinderen ook. De kinderen
moesten hun pizza delen, maar de volwassenen hadden elk een eigen pizza.
I believe that the second sentence in (69) and (70) does not contradict the first; the
handful of English and Dutch-speaking informants I informally surveyed also agreed
that there is no contradiction (with the exception one English speaker who was unable
to interpret have a pizza distributively). This suggests that the difference between P-
distributivity and collectivity is a matter of vagueness: there is nothing in the formal
semantics of the sentence that enforces a particular pizza-to-people ratio. A similar
conclusion is reached by Kratzer (2008) on the basis of the following short discourse,
which she judges consistent (note that cook is a creation verb, and hence an incorpo-
ration predicate):
(71) The two chefs cooked a stew, and the two students did, too. The chefs were very
experienced, so they each prepared a Moroccan tagine. The two students worked
together on a Boeuf Bourguignon.
The present analysis, according to which P-distributivity over indefinite objects is only
possible with incorporation verbs, also predicts that non-incorporation predicates will
not be similarly vague between a collective and a distributive interpretation. Non-
incorporation predicates are not compatible with property-type arguments; indefinite
complements of non-incorporation verbs therefore have to be interpreted as existential
quantifiers. According to the by now familiar reasoning, this means that any distri-
butivity effects with these predicates should be analysed as Q-distributivity, i.e. by
means of universal quantification over the members of the subject set that takes scope
over the existential quantifier introduced by the object. Since this is structurally dif-
ferent from the logical form that underlies collectivity, we expect it to be impossible
for the antecedent predicate to be interpreted distributively and the elided predicate
collectively, or vice versa, if said predicate does not involve an incorporation verb. And
as (72) shows, this does seem to be the case: unlike the two sentences in (70), the
sentences in (72) seem to contradict each other.
(72) The adults carried a piano upstairs and the children did, too. # Only the children
carried a piano together and the adults each carried a (different) piano on their
own.
Thus, the results of the VP-ellipsis test confirm both the distinction between in-
corporation and non-incorporation predicates with respect to the availability of P-
distributivity, and the claim that the difference between P-distributivity and collectiv-
ity is a matter of vagueness rather than ambiguity.
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4.2 Parallels with other phenomena involving non-quantificational
indefinites
The generalisation that only incorporation verbs allow group-distributive interpreta-
tions in sentences involving an indefinite object (like “The team is wearing an orange
vest”) has already provided us with an important parallel between these interpreta-
tions and various other linguistic phenomena that have been argued in the literature
to involve property-type or at least non-quantificational indefinites. In this section, we
will take a look at the indefinite objects themselves, and see to which extent they show
behaviour characteristic of property-type indefinites.
First, I will discuss some examples that suggest that adding modifiers to the in-
definite reduces its ability to receive a property interpretation, which is in line with
the observation that group-subject sentences with heavily modified objects (e.g. “The
team is wearing a torn and dirty orange vest that they found in a charity shop”) cannot
easily be interpreted distributively. Secondly, we will look at the contrast between a-
and some-indefinites; while the former may receive both a quantificational and a non-
quantificational semantics depending on the context, the latter can only be interpreted
quantificationally (Farkas 2002). This contrast influences the possible interpretations of
various phenomena involving property-type indefinites, including group distributivity.
4.2.1 Influence of descriptive weight
Not all indefinites easily receive a non-quantificational interpretation. In general, non-
quantificational interpretations are increasingly hard to get the more specific or de-
scriptively heavy we make the indefinite, as shown by the contrasts below:
(73) Opaque verbs (Zimmermann, 1993, 2006):
a. John is looking for a secretary.
b. John is looking for a tall secretary in a bottle-green cardigan.
On its opaque reading, (73a) is interpreted to mean that John is looking for any secre-
tary, not a particular one; it also has a transparent reading according to which there is
a particular person that John is looking for who happens to be a secretary. In contrast,
I am unable to get the opaque reading for (73b): it only has the transparent reading.
If we claim, with Zimmermann, that opaque readings result when the verb takes a
property-type complement, this suggests that property denotations are unavailable, or
at least not as easily available, for very specific indefinite NPs.
(74) Eigenspace semantics (Mador-Haim & Winter, 2007):
a. We’re far from a gas station.
b. We’re far from a large gas station where a friend of mine works.
The same pattern again appears in (74a-b). Sentence (74a), despite the fact that it
involves an indefinite object, has a prominent ‘universal’ interpretation according to
which we are far from all gas stations. This can be accounted for under the assumption
that a gas station may denote a property. According to the spatial semantics adopted
by Mador-Haim and Winter, the location function associated with the preposition,
when applied to a property, returns the location or ‘eigenspace’ of the entire set of
gas stations, rather than that of a particular individual gas station. Being far from
a collection of elements entails being far from each element in the collection, hence
the universal interpretation. Again, this interpretation seems harder to get when the
indefinite object is more descriptively heavy (as already observed by Iatridou, 2007;
Mador-Haim & Winter, 2015); in sentence (74b), for example, the existential inter-
pretation is much more salient than the universal one, even though the existence of
multiple gas stations that fit the description is not particularly unlikely.
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As a third example, consider light verb constructions like have a laugh, take a walk
or make a fuss, where the verb is semantically (nearly) empty and all content is provided
by the indefinite noun (such that the aforementioned examples may be paraphrased by
a verb - to laugh, to walk, to fuss - without loss of information):
(75) Light verbs (de Hoop, 1996):
a. John took a walk.
b. John took a rather difficult walk.
The a-indefinite in (75a) shows all the signs of property denotation: it is nonspecific,
number neutral, and scopes with the verb; in line with this, De Hoop analyses light verb
constructions like the above in terms of property-type indefinites. On the other hand,
while (75a) can easily be paraphrased by saying something like “John walked around”,
the indefinite a rather difficult walk in (75b) intuitively seems to refer to a specific
walking route27. Again, this fits the pattern established by the previous examples: the
more specific or descriptively rich an indefinite gets, the more likely it is to receive an
existential interpretation.
Group distributive sentences like “The team is wearing a blue shirt” conform to
this pattern: the more modifiers we add to the object NP, the more the anomalous
collective interpretation seems to be forced.28 For example, sentence (76) suggests
that the team as a whole is somehow wearing a single specific shirt; the distributive
interpretation, according to which each team member is wearing a shirt matching that
particular description, is much less salient (even though it is more likely).
(76) # The First Aid team is wearing a torn and dirty orange vest.
Under an existential interpretation of a torn and dirty blue shirt this observation is
unexpected. The plural-subject counterpart of (76) does not show an effect of descrip-
tive weight; the full sentences in (77) can be interpreted distributively as easily as the
lighter versions can:
(77) a. The children are wearing a (torn and dirty) orange vest.
b. De kinderen dragen een (vies, gescheurd en in een kringloopwinkel aangeschaft)
oranje hesje.
‘The children are wearing a (dirty, torn and bought in a thrift shop) orange
vest’
But if specific/descriptively heavy indefinites generally resist non-existential interpre-
tations, these facts are just what we would expect if the distributive interpretation of
group-subject sentences like “The team is wearing an orange vest” has to be analysed
in terms of such non-existential indefinites, while an alternative analysis (using the
D-operator) is available for plural-subject sentences.
4.2.2 A versus some
A very similar argument can be made on the basis of a contrast between a- and some-
indefinites. As observed by (e.g. ?), a-indefinites can easily be analysed as predicates
or properties, while some-indefinites are nearly always quantificational (‘stubbornly
quantificational’, as Farkas calls them). This contrast between a and some is reflected
27Note that this is not a consequence of making the indefinite descriptively heavy per se - sentences
like “John took a calming aimless walk”, like (75a), do not seem to refer to a specific walking trail either.
The difference seems to be that calming and aimless are subject-oriented modifiers, while rather difficult
modifies walk itself; the latter seems to force the existential interpretation of a walk.
28This influence of modification was first pointed out to me by Anna Szabolcsi (p.c.).
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by nearly all of the previously-mentioned phenomena that have been argued in the lit-
erature to involve property-type indefinites (unless otherwise specified, the judgements
here are my own):
(78) Be-predicates:
a. John is a linguist.
b. John is #some linguist. (on the intended interpretation)
In (78a), it is predicated of John that he is a linguist - a linguist is of type xe, ty and
the sentence is entirely on a par with, for example, a sentence like John is tall. In
contrast, (78b) cannot express such a simple predication. Its most readily available
interpretation is a taxonomic one that may be paraphrased as ‘John is a (specific or
nonspecific) kind of linguist’; in addition, it has an (albeit slightly strange) identity
reading with is as a full verb, paraphraseable as ‘There is some linguist and this person
is John’. Neither reading involves a predicate linguist of type xe, ty, suggesting that
this is not a possible denotation for the indefinite some linguist. Similarly:
(79) Opaque verbs:
a. John is looking for a secretary.
b. John is looking for some secretary.
As we have seen before, (79a) has both an opaque and a transparent reading. In
contrast, (79b) only seems to have the latter (in addition to a ‘some kind of’-reading
comparable to the one in (79b)). Under a property analysis of opaque verb comple-
ments, this suggests that property denotations are unavailable for some-indefinites.
(80) Eigenspace semantics:
a. We’re far from a gas station.
b. We’re far from some gas station.
The same pattern again appears in (80a-b): as Mador-Haim and Winter (2015) note,
the ‘universal’ interpretation of (80a), which they derive by analysing a gas station as
a property, is unavailable with the some-indefinite in (80b).
The contrast can also be observed with light verb constructions:
(81) Light verbs:
a. John took a walk.
b. John took some walk.
Unlike the light verb reading of (81a), (81b) cannot be paraphrased as ‘John walked’
without loss of information, because unlike (81a) it asserts that there exists a par-
ticular walking route that John took. Again, the some-indefinite only seems to have
a quantificational interpretation, while the a-indefinite can denote either a quantified
expression or a property.29
The above contrasts suggest, in line with Farkas’s (2002) claim about the ‘stub-
bornly quantificational’ nature of some-indefinites, that property denotations are not
available (or at least much less readily so) for some-indefinites than they are for a-
indefinites. Since the P-distributivity approach advocated for in this chapter attributes
certain group distributivity effects to the involvement of property-type indefinites, it
predicts that these effects will be easily available with a-indefinites, but not with some.
And this does seem to be the case:
29With existential there-sentences (which (McNally, 1992) argues involve property-type NPs), the con-
trast is less clear - “There is some tree in the garden” is fine, and although a taxonomic kind reading (‘some
kind of tree’) seems the most readily available, it also has a reading on which its meaning is identical to that
of “There is a tree in the garden”. Neither does the descriptive weight of the indefinite seem to influence its
grammaticality in a there-sentence (apart from a required heavy NP shift): a sentence like “There is a tree
in the garden that my best friend planted there ten years ago” is fine.
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(82) a. The team is wearing an orange vest.
b. The team is wearing some orange vest.
Sentence (82b) has a salient (albeit unlikely) collective interpretation according to
which the entire team is wearing the same vest together; but I find it very hard to
interpret distributively.30
This difference between a- and some-indefinites is unexpected under an analysis of
our group distributivity data in which an orange vest denotes a quantifier (just like
some orange vest), but it is precisely what we would expect if the availability of a dis-
tributive interpretation in (82) depends on the availability of a property interpretation
for the object.
5 Remaining issues: modified numerals
A case of binary P-distributivity I have not mentioned so far involves modified numer-
ical indefinites:




less than four medals.
at most two medals.
,.
-
(83) is true if every member of the battalion received the number of medals mentioned,
so under our analysis of group distributivity, the indefinites in (83) should be able
to denote properties. Modified numerals may also appear in de dicto readings with
opaque predicates (84a), there-sentences (84b) and with be-predication (84c):
(84) a. Lily wants to adopt exactly four orphans.
b. There are less than four cats in the garden.
c. These are exactly / at most 20 dots.
According to the latter fact, they count as property indefinites under our definition;
considering their analyses of de dicto readings and existential sentences, respectively,
Zimmermann and McNally also need to claim that they denote properties.
However, a property analysis of these modified numerals is problematic (McNally
1992). Because they are not upward entailing, exactly n, less than n or at most n
exhaustively cover a domain: (84a) is incompatible with Lily wanting to adopt more
than four orphans, and (84b) is incompatible with there being more than three cats in
the garden. In other words, stating that a predicate P holds for exactly n or at most n
entities also amounts to stating that P does not hold for the rest of the entities in the
domain. This contrasts with unmodified numerical indefinites like four orphans or two
30According to my own judgements, it is possible to get a distributive interpretation for (82b) if one
puts in some effort to read some orange vest as ‘some kind of orange vest’. This interpretation may be
paraphrased as ‘There is a kind of orange vest v such that the team is wearing instantiations of v’. Since
this reading involves a quantificational interpretation of the indefinite (with quantification over subkinds
of orange vest rather than over individual vests), but shows distributivity effects regardless, one might
wonder whether quantification over subkinds would not be enough to account for the group distributivity
data, eliminating the need for an analysis based on property-denoting indefinites. However, while it is well
possible for quantification over subkinds to be involved in deriving at least some of the possible distributive
interpretations with group NP subjects, the involvement of non-quantificational indefinites is independently
supported by the evidence in this section. It should also be noted that an analysis of group distributivity
based on quantification over subkinds is still incomplete without an account of the process that licenses
the inference that it is not the kind itself that is being worn by the team members, but its instantiations,
which is precisely the sort of process that is captured by the notion of polyadic P-distributivity. In short,
the observation that quantification over subkinds might be responsible for some distributivity effects with
group subjects does not invalidate any of the claims made in this paper.
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Figure 3: An array of dots as a context for sentence (84c))
cats, which are monotone increasing and hence compatible with the existence of more
orphans or more cats of which the expressed property holds.
All this means that it is unclear how the truth conditions associated with the non-
increasing modified numerals in (83) and (84) could be derived without quantification
over the domain of medals, orphans or cats; and yet, their appearance in sentences like
(83) and (84) seems to call for a non-quantificational analysis.
McNally (1992) proposes to solve the problem by assuming that exactly and at
most do not modify the indefinites themselves; rather, they should be treated as ad-
verbial modifiers comparable to only or even. Evidence for this claim is the fact that
exactly and at most can appear in other positions in the sentence without changing its
semantics:
(85) a. At most, there were four cats in the garden.
b. Lily wants to adopt four orphans exactly.
In McNally’s analysis, exactly and at most are applied to propositions associated with
ordered alternative sets; essentially, rrat mostssppq or rrexactlyssppq means that there
are no true propositions in this alternative set that are ranked higher than p. Thus,
rrat mostssprrthere were four cats in the gardenssq would be false if the alternative propo-
sition There were five cats in the garden were true, since the latter (a semantically
stronger statement) is ranked higher than the former.
The analysis of modified numerals proposed in Brasoveanu (2013)31 is technically
very different from McNally’s, but similar in spirit in the sense that modified numerals
are assumed to make two separate semantic contributions: the contribution to the
at-issue content is the maximal set of entities that satisfy both predicates (e.g., the
maximal set of entities that are cats and are in the garden), whereas the cardinality
requirement is enforced separately, in the form of a postsupposition.
However, although both McNally’s and Brasoveanu’s analyses can solve our problem
for at most and exactly, they both leave less than unaccounted for - in McNally’s
case, because less than clearly cannot be reanalysed a propositional modifier, and in
Brasoveanu’s, because his analysis only applies to so-called Class B numerals (Nouwen,
2010) and less than is Class A. So it seems that a truly satisfying property analysis
of non-upward entailing modified numerals, that does not result in the wrong truth
conditions, has yet to be given. I will not attempt to do so here, but leave it as an
open question.
31I am indebted to an anonymous NALS reviewer for attending me to Brasoveanu’s paper.
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6 Conclusions
We started out the second part of the paper with an apparent counterexample to
the analysis of group NPs (and, consequently, to our empirical argument in favour of
P-distributivity) that was presented in the first part. However, I argued that this ap-
parent case of Q-distributivity with group nouns - sentences with an indefinite object
like “The team is wearing an orange vest” - can be analysed in terms of P-distributivity
if we assume a property analysis of the a-indefinite, following much recent literature.
The most important support for this claim comes from the observation that the class of
predicates that allow the relevant distributive interpretations coincides with the class
of ‘incorporation’ predicates that allow a bare object in languages like Catalan, Greek
and Norwegian. Thus, the evidence on group distributivity presented in this paper
suggests that these predicates have special semantic properties even in languages like
Dutch and English that never allow bare nouns in object position, and adds another
item to the list of proposed semantic phenomena that involve property interpretations
for full NPs in argument positions.
There is another ‘moral’ to this paper, which involves the way we study distributivity
in general. Since distributivity is arguably not a unified phenomenon, we should be
careful to draw conclusions about the formal semantic analysis of sentences involving
collections based on distributivity effects: not all distributivity involves semantic plu-
rality or quantification. In order to make sure that our data actually have something
to say about the particular formal theory we need evidence (or counterevidence) for,
we need to pay close attention to the linguistic context (whether the subject is a plural
or a group NP; the morphosyntactic number of the VP; the type of indefinite object;
whether the VP involves an incorporation predicate or not...) and use it to bring out
the empirical distinction between P- and Q-distributivity. Only then can we draw
sound conclusions on the nature of the D-operator or the way lexical and pragmatic
factors are involved in the interpretation of distributive sentences.
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